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RESTORATION CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SOUTH
PACIFIC
Venkat Iyer†
Abstract: The dilemmas confronting societies which move from a period of
authoritarian rule to liberal democracy have increasingly engaged the attention of
academic experts and policy-makers alike. One issue which has received comparatively
less notice, however, is the phenomenon of “restoration constitutionalism,” i.e. the
process by which the transitional society is sought to be returned to the constitutional
order that predated the authoritarian rule. Recent events in Fiji offer a good example of
how this process works in practice. This article looks at the relationship between
constitutionalism and transitional regimes, and argues that, where the “rupture” in a
constitutional order is relatively short-lived, restoration constitutionalism provides a
smoother and quicker return to liberal politics than any other modality of transition.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The closing years of the twentieth century saw an unprecedented
number of societies undergoing significant transition of one kind or another,
usually from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy. Much of the impetus
for this process of change came from the collapse of ideologies such as
communism and apartheid which had held sway over governments in many
parts of the world for a generation or more.1 This period also saw in several
countries the end of repressive regimes of a non-ideological character.2 In
some cases, this was a result of the withdrawal from their territories of
outside powers which had either been occupying them or exercising de facto
control over their running.3 The end of the twentieth century was marked,
too, by the emergence of “peace processes” in a number of societies whose
populations had been riven by long-running ethnic, religious or other strife.4
Less welcomingly, the period also witnessed some transitions of an illiberal
character: from relatively stable and peaceful democracies to military
dictatorships or other regimes antithetical to freedom and democracy, often
following coups or other illegal seizures of power.5
These transitions varied widely in scale, sweep and speed; some led to
dramatic transformations in the political landscapes of the countries

†
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Transitional Justice Institute, University of Ulster at Jordanstown, United Kingdom; e-mail:
v.iyer@ulster.ac.uk. The author is indebted to Professor Ruti Teitel of the New York Law School for her
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1
The obvious examples in this category being, respectively, the republics of the former Soviet
Union and its client states in Central and Eastern Europe, and South Africa.
2
The 1998 fall of Suharto’s military regime in Indonesia is an example of this.
3
Indonesia’s withdrawal from East Timor provides an example.
4
E.g., Northern Ireland, Sri Lanka, Bosnia and Herzegovinia.
5
E.g., Burma.
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concerned, while others proved to be less impressive in their results.6
Unsurprisingly, the phenomenon itself has attracted considerable academic
attention, spawning both a body of literature which has grown exponentially
in recent years7 and a discrete discipline of study that is encompassed within
the broad title of “transitional justice.”8
The predominant concern of transitional justice studies has,
understandably, been to find ways and means of dealing with the maleficent
legacies of a repressive society’s past as it grapples with the challenges of
building a new liberal future. As such, much attention has been focused in
the published literature on measures and processes—such as truth
commissions, reparations, lustration, punishment and compensation
schemes—which help achieve that objective. The role of law—including
constitutional law—in managing transitions has figured prominently in the
literature: a role which, arguably, is as important as it is wide-ranging.
One contribution that constitutional law might be able to offer in
transitional situations has received less attention than it deserves. This
relates to the phenomenon of “restoration constitutionalism,”9 a process
under which, as part of the liberalising agenda, the transitional society is
sought to be returned to the constitutional order that prevailed before the
eclipse or collapse of democracy and/or the rule of law, rather than being
faced with the prospect of fashioning a new constitutional order. This article
will examine the phenomenon of restoration constitutionalism in relation to
recent events in the South Pacific island state of Fiji—a jurisdiction where
the transition from the disruptive effects of an attempted coup d’etat—the
third in less than a decade and a half—has been beset by problems of racial
politics, electoral complexity and constitutional engineering.
The events described represent an instructive example of the
“restoration” modality of transition. Fiji was able to return, quickly and
successfully, from a state of constitutional breakdown to a democratic status
quo ante. Instrumental to this achievement were the courageous efforts of
the Fijian courts: by insisting on a return to a higher rule-of-law standard
embodied in the pre-coup constitutional order, the courts strengthened rather
6
One telling contrast is that provided by South Africa, which, within a period of less than five
years, moved fairly painlessly from apartheid rule to a functioning democracy based on inclusiveness and
the rule of law, and Indonesia, where, despite the ouster of the ruling dictator, President Suharto,
democracy has taken much longer to establish.
7
See, e.g., Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes (Neil
Kritz ed., 1995); Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (2000); Transitional Justice and the Rule of Law in
New Democracies (J.A. McAdams ed., 1997); Juan J. Linz & Alfred C. Stephan, Problems of Democratic
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-Communist Europe (1996); The
Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratising Societies (Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen
Gonzalez-Enriquez & Paloma Aguilar eds., 2001).
8
The underlying assumption in this branch of study has, almost invariably, been that the transitional
process is a liberalising, rather than a retrogressive, one. See, e.g., TEITEL, supra note 7, at 5.
9
The term is borrowed from Ruti Teitel. See TEITEL, supra note 7, at 206. Teitel touches upon this
issue as part of her discussion of “transitional constitutionalism.” See id. at 191-211.
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than weakened the state’s commitment to liberal political virtues. The vigor,
determination and alacrity with which the Fijian judiciary—at all levels—
exerted itself in the attempts to arrest the longer-term impact of the coup on
democracy and the rule of law, even as it recognized the limits of judicial
activism in such circumstances, stands in sharp contrast to the traditional
behavior of courts during periods of constitutional crises. This article argues
that, where the “rupture” in a constitutional order is relatively short-lived,
restoration constitutionalism provides a smoother and quicker return to
liberal politics than any other modality of transition. In addition, several
lessons concerning the costs and benefits of restoration constitutionalism
may be generalized from the Fijian experience.
Before turning to the facts of the Fijian situation, it is useful to set out
the legal and conceptual issues relevant to the current discussion. Part II of
this article addresses this aspect. It deals with the nature of constitutions and
constitutionalism, their role during transitional periods, the contribution
made by constitutional courts to transitional processes, and the phenomenon
of “restoration” constitutionalism—an issue especially pertinent in relation
to Fiji. Part III sets out the factual and historical background to the crisis in
Fiji which sparked the country’s slide into violent anarchy in May 2000.
This part includes a discussion of the various twists and turns in Fiji’s
constitutional odyssey over the years. Part IV describes the extraordinary
contribution that the Fijian judiciary made to the restoration of constitutional
values and the rule of law in the aftermath of the events of May 2000. Part
V evaluates the gains and losses of the restoration process and outlines the
lessons that can be drawn from the Fijian experience in transitional
constitutionalism.
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE TRANSITIONAL PROCESS

II.

The ever-present tension between constitutionalism and revolutionary
change has occupied legal minds for centuries, and it has posed serious
dilemmas for the architects of liberal regimes in societies emerging from
authoritarianism or repressive government.10 Constitutionalism itself is a
relatively non-contentious concept, even if disagreements have occasionally
been expressed over some of its individual components. The following
simple definition captures the essence of the concept:
Constitutionalism is the idea . . . that government can and
should be legally limited in its powers, and that its authority
depends on its observing these limitations.11

10

See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1961).
Wil Waluchow, Constitutionalism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N.
Zalta ed., 2004), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/constitutionalism/.
11
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Implicit in that definition are several attributes, including: institutional
realization of liberalism, recognition of the sovereignty of the people,
affirmation of the supremacy of the constitution, and a conception of
equality before the law under which the rulers are subject to the same
discipline and legal constraints as the ruled.12
Constitutionalism has been seen as indispensable to democracies in
the modern world; it is usually regarded as the glue which holds a liberal
political order together and enables societies based on the rule of law to
withstand the shocks that political upheavals inflict on them from time to
time.13 However, that image of constitutionalism has recently been
challenged as anachronistic, especially in the context of transitional
processes. As Ruti Teitel notes in her pioneering study of transitional
justice, “it cannot capture the constitutional developments associated with
political change during the last half century and, as such, needs to be
supplemented.”14 She offers an alternative paradigm of transitional
constitutionalism in the following terms:
Transitional constitutionalism not only is constituted by the
prevailing political order but also is constitutive of political
change. This is the constitutional document’s constructivist
role. Traditional constitutions arise in a variety of processes,
[often playing multiple roles: serving conventional
constitution's purposes as well as] having other more radical
purposes in transformative politics. Transitional constitution
making is also responsive to prior rule, through principles that
critically refine the prevailing political system, effecting further
political change in the system. Transitional constitutions are
simultaneously backward- and forward-looking, informed by a
conception of constitutional justice that is distinctively
transitional.15
Quite clearly, extraordinary situations usually call for exceptional responses,
and this is reflected in the jurisprudence of transitional regimes which, as
Teitel explains, “does not follow such core principles of legality as
regularity, generality, and prospectivity—the very essence of the rule of law
in ordinary times.”16 Even so, it would be wrong to assume that the normal
principles of legality have no place in transitional constitutionalism. Indeed,
12
See, e.g., Bo Li, What is Constitutionalism?, 1:6 PERSPECTIVES (2000) (citing STEPHEN HOLMES,
PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 5 (1995), available at
http://www.oycf.org/Perspectives/6_063000/what_is_constitutionalism.htm.
13
See, e.g., JOHN ELSTER & RUNE SLAGSTAD, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY: STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1988).
14
TEITEL, supra note 7, at 191.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 215.
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as Teitel herself acknowledges, the situation is much more complex, and it
consequently requires a nuanced response from analysts and policymakers.17
It is worth noting, too, that many of the techniques deployed in
transition-management are also routinely used in non-transitional contexts,
so that any analysis which seeks to paint the transitional justice process as an
exclusive or a special one, standing in complete isolation from ordinary legal
processes, would be misleading. The following warning from the authors of
a thought-provoking recent article on the subject deserves to be quoted in
extenso:
In general, analysts of transitional justice, who are typically
steeped in moral theory, political theory and science, or in
highly theorised international law, have gone wrong through
insufficient appreciation of the ordinary law of consolidated
democracies. They have erred, not by virtue of inadequate
moral or political analysis, but by holding a stereotyped picture
of ordinary justice, one in which all laws are always
prospective, individuals costlessly obtain compensation for all
harms to person or property inflicted by others, and transitions
essentially never occur because the legal system runs smoothly
in settled equilibrium. In our picture, by contrast, ordinary
lawmaking must routinely cope with policy shifts caused by
economic and technological shocks and by changes in the value
judgments of citizens and legal elites.
These jarring
discontinuities predictably create transition problems. The law
has developed a range of pragmatic tools for managing such
problems while maintaining social order, ensuring some
stability of expectations, and occasionally aspiring to see justice
done. None of this commits us to defending all of the law’s
pragmatic tools of transition-management, which are in some
cases excessively crude, inadequately theorised, or defended on
specious grounds. But it should explode the assumption that
transitional justice is a distinctive topic that presents a distinct
set of moral and jurisprudential dilemmas.18
That said, any approach which treats transitional justice measures as
“presumptively suspect,” on the ground, for example, that they are usually
17
Teitel conceives of transitions being arrayed along a continuum, in which the possible modalities
range, on the one hand, from “critical” (which involves a maximally transformative legal repertoire aimed
at achieving a “clean break” from the policies of the previous regime) to, on the other, “residual” (in which
the pre-existing legal order is largely preserved). Id. at 216.
18
Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, University of
Chicago Public Law Working Paper No. 40, at 3-4 (2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_
id=387920.
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retroactive and therefore illiberal, would be quite wrong as well. As even
the authors cited above recognise, retrospective measures themselves often
have important forward-looking justifications and it would, therefore, be
unfair to dismiss them out of hand. 19
A.

Paradigmatic Transitions Attempt “Clean Breaks” with the Past via
Constitution-Making or New Enforcement Mechanisms

Teitel’s new paradigm of transitional constitutionalism is, particularly
relevant to situations which involve a distinct break with the past, either as a
result of war,20 revolution,21 or other cataclysmic event, or following a
negotiated settlement reached between the leaders of the ancien regime and
those desiring fundamental change in the character of the polity.22 Given the
difficulties involved in the wholesale reconstruction of the political and legal
systems which such transitions entail, the need for stop-gap constitutional
arrangements is obvious: this need is usually met by a transitional
constitution, designed to serve as a bridge between the old and new regimes.
Such a constitution can, as well as providing some much-needed stability
during what is usually a period of great political ferment, also act as a
catalyst for the emergence of the new liberal order. Teitel cites South
Africa’s transitional constitution of 199323 as a shining example of the
creative manner in which transitional constitutionalism can be harnessed in
favour of liberal values.24
As demonstrated by the experience of some of the former Soviet bloc
countries in the immediate aftermath of the fall of communism, constitutionmaking is not always a high priority for transitional regimes. Here, partly
due to of a lack of consensus over an ideal model of constitutionalism for
the future, and partly because of an urgent desire to embrace constitutional
enforcement rather than constitutional deliberation,25 the governments
decided to establish constitutional courts with strong judicial review powers
that would function under Soviet-era constitutional frameworks, albeit with
some modifications to those frameworks.26 This mode of transitional
constitutionalism was intended to advance the rule of law by creating a new

19

Id. at 4.
E.g., member-states of the Former Yugoslavia.
21
E.g., The Philippines at the end of the rule of President Marcos.
22
E.g., South Africa. Such a clean break may also follow the decision of a colonial power to
withdraw from territory it has ruled for a substantial period of time.
23
S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993.
24
TEITEL, supra note 7, at 198.
25
This desire is attributable to widespread popular disenchantment with the constitutional culture
that had prevailed under communist rule where the rhetoric of rights was never matched by reality.
26
Hungary and Poland are prime examples where, as late as 1994, not much movement was made
towards drafting new constitutional texts.
20
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culture in which human rights and other freedom-enhancing values did not
remain mere paper promises.
The post-communist preference for enforcement mechanisms over
new constitutional documents is an example of a gradualist approach to
transitional constitutionalism under which newly democratised societies get
the necessary space to debate contested conceptions of justice and the rule of
law rather than being steamrolled into accepting one pre-determined model
or another. Where a society has suffered oppression and despotic
government for a significant length of time, this approach is clearly
attractive, not least because of its tendency to help create an environment in
which durable constitutional change is likely to take root. The disadvantage
is that, in societies which are far too fractious or prone to grave instability,
lengthy delays in settling the parameters of the new constitutional
dispensation may result in the momentum for reform being lost.27
So much for countries which have endured prolonged tyranny. But
what about situations where the need is not so much to make a “clean break”
with the past as to return the society to the pre-revolutionary political and
constitutional order—an order which, for all its imperfections, nonetheless
represented a reasonable adherence to liberal values and democratic
pluralism? This question will be addressed at some length below in the
context of Fiji where, it is submitted, the revolutionary events of May 2000,
far from moving the country in a liberalising direction, had the effect of
upsetting a delicate and carefully-crafted constitutional settlement which had
sought, democratically, to promote freedom, equality and justice among the
country’s deeply-divided peoples.28
B.

Restoration Constitutionalism Is an Alternative to the “Clean Break”
of Paradigm Transitions

Also interesting for the purposes of the present article are the
experiences of other post-Communist states which followed the
“restoration” modality in their transitional odyssey and chose to return to
their pre-revolutionary constitutional orders. Czechoslovakia (before its
break-up), for instance, used the country’s 1920 Constitution as the template
for its new constitution.29 The attractiveness of this course of action is not
difficult to see: for a people so deeply scarred by the experience of
27
This may be said to have happened in Poland where it took the post-communist rulers some eight
years to adopt a new constitution. See e.g., Irena Grudzinska Gross et al., The 1997 Polish Constitution,
6:2,3 EAST EUROPEAN CONST. REV. 64 (1997), available at http://www.law.nyu.edu/
eecr/vol6num2/feature/index.html.
28
This settlement was contained in the 1997 Constitution of Fiji—a document which was the result
of extensive public consultation and which had been approved by a democratically-elected legislature
representing all sections of the Fijian population.
29
See Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus
Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 531 (1991).
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Bolshevik repression, it offered an opportunity to, as it were, obliterate the
memory of Communist rule and to return to a political order which was, at
least symbolically, far more comforting. Whether or not the move assures
political stability is, of course, open to question, but as even a slightly
sceptical Teitel concedes:
[R]estoration constitutions have a normative pull that manages
to evade the dilemma of constitutional beginnings. To the
extent that such transitional constitutions are restorative, there
are seemingly no constitutional beginnings, only returns. Such
constitutionalism eliminates the tensions inherent in
constitutionalism in periods of political change.30
Nor is restoration constitutionalism entirely backward-looking. Properly
applied, it can achieve some beneficial results for the future, such as:
[P]roviding a method for the public to recapture lost traditions
and institutions; depriving former officials of political and
economic influence that they could use to frustrate reform;
signalling a commitment to property rights, the market, [and in
the case of divided societies, it may be added, protection for
minority rights] and democratic institutions; and establishing
constitutional precedents that may deter future leaders from
repeating the abuses of the old regime.31
For a jurisprudence associated with political flux, transitional justice does,
of course, involve a higher politicization of the law and also some
compromise in rule-of-law standards.32 The scope for such politicization
and compromise however, is often much reduced in the case of restoration
constitutionalism as opposed to other modalities of the transitional process,
as will be demonstrated below in relation to the events in Fiji. By insisting
on a return to a higher rule-of-law standard embodied in the pre-revolution
constitutional order, the Fijian courts have strengthened rather than
weakened the state’s commitment to those virtues usually associated with
liberal politics.33
Most constitutions are, it is widely agreed, the embodiment of
compromises made between different societal groups. Where a prior
constitution is the result of a duly constituted deliberative process,
conducted on largely democratic lines, there is, arguably, a strong
presumption of legitimacy attached to it which cannot be easily dismissed.
This fact, coupled with the universally accepted idea that constitutions are
30

TEITEL, supra note 7, at 206.
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 18, at 5.
See Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy, 16 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 69, 90 (2003)
[hereinafter Teitel, Transitional Justice Genealogy].
33
See infra Part IV (defending this proposition).
31
32
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made to last long and should not be allowed to be tinkered with unless
absolutely necessary, lends a presumptive advantage to the process of
restorative constitutionalism in post-revolutionary situations.
In the absence of any overwhelming reasons for rejecting a return to
the status quo ante, restoration constitutionalism clearly holds out the
promise of a minimally disruptive return to liberal politics. It usually avoids
the need for the new government to embark on an extensive process of
reconstruction (including the undoing—except minimally—of the effects of
the intervening illiberal events). In societies where the prior constitution is
associated with strong unifying sentiments which have not been dimmed by
the passage of time, a return to it is often compelling: witness, for example,
the sizeable support for a return to the monarchy in countries such as
Romania and Serbia.34 In some cases, a preference for the ancien regime
may be based on nothing more than resistance to simple transplants or
adaptations of constitutional structures from outside, especially the West.35
Where the “rupture” in a constitutional order is comparatively shortlived, as was the case with Fiji,36 restorative constitutionalism is particularly
attractive, not least because it offers the prospect of greater constitutional
continuity and a smoother and quicker return to liberal politics than would
be the case with any of the other modalities of transition. Restorative
constitutionalism, in these circumstances, also offers another practical
advantage which is by no means insignificant: it dispenses with the need for
protracted, expensive and often fractious negotiations for a new
constitutional settlement and new political institutions, not to mention messy
power-struggles for control of the constitution-enactment process. But a
return to the pre-revolutionary order can only work where there is a sizeable
popular consensus around that order,37 and where the prior constitutional and
legal infrastructure remains capable of reactivation at short notice.
C.

A Typology of Restoration Constitutionalism

It is possible to construct a typology in the continuum of restoration
constitutionalism based on the time-frame within which the process is
attempted and/or completed. At one end of the continuum would be what
may be called “deep” restoration where the reversion to the original
constitution, i.e. the constitution which was overthrown by the intervening
34
Whether such sentiments are based on hard-nosed assessments of the worth of the institutions
around which they are centred or on mere nostalgia is immaterial for the purposes of the present argument.
35
See András Sajó, Preferred Generations: A Paradox of Restoration Constitutions, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 847, 854 (1993).
36
The May 2000 coup was swiftly put down and an interim civilian government was installed within
a matter of weeks, as is explained below.
37
It would help, too, if the pre-revolutionary order was largely compliant with international norms
on basic human rights, including the rights of effective democratic participation by ethnic, religious, racial,
linguistic and other recognised minorities.
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illiberal regime, is attempted after a significant length of time, usually many
decades. Typical examples of this kind of restoration would be those
considered in some of the former Soviet client-states such as the Czech
Republic or Hungary on the fall of the Berlin Wall, where the preCommunist constitutions had been out of use for half a century or more.
Here, any return to the ancien regime would pose formidable practical
difficulties, given the inevitable need to unravel a large number of settled
transactions that may have occurred during the intervening period, and, in
some cases, even a need to revive constitutional concepts, structures and
provisions which may have suffered obsolescence along the way.38
To some extent, any disconnect between the values of the original
constitution makers and those of the transitional society may be remedied by
creative interpretation or adaptation of the constitutional text by
contemporary judges. In this way, the vexing problem of “generation related
constitutional self,”39 which is likely to dog some countries where a deep
restoration is attempted, can be avoided. Where, however, the provisions of
the original constitution are clearly inadequate to accommodate the needs of
the present, or where the intervening period has seen irreversible changes of
such magnitude as to render those provisions irrelevant, total restoration
may not be an option.40
At the other end of the continuum would be what may be called
“shallow” restoration where the interregnum between the eclipse of the prerevolutionary constitution and the end of the revolution is a very short one,
as happened in Fiji in relation to the events described in this article. Here,
the process of return is relatively easy and less painful, even if, as often
happens, political compulsions may still require some compromises to be
made to accommodate the competing demands put on the new government.
A number of restorations will fall between those two extremes, and,
depending on how distant they are in time from the overthrow of the ancien
regime, they may be classified as more or less deep. Generally speaking, the
“deeper” the restoration, the greater the effort needed to stabilize the
emerging political and constitutional structures. Where the liberalizing
impetus itself comes from a revolution (a “counter-revolution”), there may
be additional work to be done to reconcile the restored constitutionalism
with the unsettled and often messy political landscape which emerges from
the revolution. Such reconciliation would, for obvious reasons, be easier
where the restoration has been shallow rather than deep.
38
These difficulties may be compounded by a growing obsolescence of some of the concepts,
principles and provisions of the prior Constitution.
39
See, e.g., Sajó, supra note 35, at 847.
40
Sajó cites the example of Czechoslovakia immediately after the end of Communism, noting that
even a return to the quite advanced Masaryk Constitution was impossible in view of Slovak and other
minority concerns. Id. at 853.
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It stands to reason as well that deeper restorations involve higher costs
than shallower ones. These costs may be either social costs (e.g. assuaging
the hurt individuals and groups may have suffered as a result of the
revolution) or material costs (e.g. providing for restitution of confiscated
property), or both. Likewise, the problem of retroactivity in cases involving
political justice loom larger in deeper restorations than they do in shallower
ones.
In terms of legitimacy, deeper restorations may prove particularly
problematic, because with each passing generation the bonds that connect
the people to the ancien regime are likely to weaken; where, for example,
the liberalising event occurs well after those who had any personal
connection with, or experience of, the ancien regime have passed, it is
possible that that the prospect of a return to the political and constitutional
arrangements of that regime may not appeal as strongly to the present
rulers—and indeed to sections of the present populace generally—as it may
have done to their predecessors. This has the potential to render any
attempted restoration weak and contentious, given the lack of widespread
popular enthusiasm for it. This may not, however, be true of all societies: in
some, a strong institutional memory of the virtues of the ancien regime may
guarantee an enduring appeal for it, regardless of the length of time that has
elapsed since its extinguishment. This would make the process of
restoration resemble more closely a “shallow” restoration rather than a
“deep” one.
Interestingly, the impetus for the use of restorative constitutionalism
usually comes, as it did in the case of the former Soviet client states referred
to above, from the political establishment. In the case of Fiji, however, the
higher judiciary played an equally, if not more, important role in pushing the
process along. This may or may not be a good thing: much depends on the
credibility and the prestige which the courts enjoy within the society
undergoing transition; more importantly, the success of court-driven
transitional initiatives is heavily dependent on the ability of judges to ensure
that their orders are respected and implemented by politicians in both letter
and spirit—an outcome which is by no means guaranteed in many societies.
In this respect as well, the Fijian experience offers some unique insights
which are worth studying.
III.

FIJI: THE FACTUAL AND HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

A.

History

To better understand the transitional process in Fiji, it is helpful to
take a brief look at the recent history of that country and of the events which
have shaped its destiny in the past few years. Although Fiji has experienced
multiple crises since its independence from British rule in 1970, the focus
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here is the coup d’etat mounted in May 2000 and its aftermath. In one
sense, it could be argued that the country has been in a state of transition
since around 1987 (when the first of those crises erupted), but, for reasons of
practicability, this article will concentrate on the transitional process which
began with the reversal of the 2000 coup.
A group of 844 islands lying at the centre of the South Pacific, Fiji
became a British colony in 1874 when the then ruling tribal chiefs, led by
the ‘King of Fiji,’ Ratu Seru Cakobau, ceded the islands to Queen Victoria.41
The British soon began importing indentured labor from India to provide a
workforce for Fiji’s main economic activity, viz. sugarcane cultivation.
Between 1879 and 1916 (when the indentureship ended), over 60,000
Indians had been brought into Fiji. Nearly half of them opted to stay on
after their tenure of service had been completed, and following further
waves of voluntary immigration, the Indian population steadily increased, so
much so that by 1945 Indians formed a majority of inhabitants in Fiji.42
Although the administration was carried out under typical colonial lines, the
British also gave the Fijian chiefs a limited amount of autonomy:
Through the system of indirect rule, evolved by Lord Lugard
and applied by his successors elsewhere, separate Fijian
institutions were established to facilitate ruling them. These
institutions, while creating a ‘state within a state’, gave the
Fijian chiefs limited powers to rule their people, and to deeply
influence the subsequent history of the colony. The objectives
underlying [the Governor, Sir Arthur Gordon’s] policies were
similar to those which had given rise to colonial practices
elsewhere: a divide and rule policy whereby the colonial
government divided in order to rule what it integrated in order
to exploit.43
One important policy decision the British made early on, with profound
consequences in subsequent years, was to ordain that nearly ninety percent
of the land mass of the country (the part left over after what had alienated to
the Europeans) would remain under indigenous Fijian ownership.44 The
Indian population, since their release from labour indentureship,
41
In the Deed of Cession, signed on Oct. 10, 1874, Cakobau asked the British to “exercise a
watchful control over the welfare of his children and people; and who, having survived the barbaric law
and age, are now submitting themselves under Her Majesty’s rule to civilisation.”
42
By 1986, Indians accounted for 48.6 percent of the population and indigenous Fijians 46.2 per
cent, the remaining being made up of Europeans, mixed-race Europeans, Chinese, and other groups. See
HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF
CONFLICTING RIGHTS 427 (1996). The “other groups” include Rotumans, inhabitants of the neighbouring
Pacific island of Rotuma—an island which is part of the territory of Fiji.
43
VICTOR LAL, FIJI: COUPS IN PARADISE 2 (1990).
44
Ralph R. Premdas, Balance and Ethnic Conflict in Fiji, in THE POLITICS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT
REGULATION: CASE STUDIES OF PROTRACTED ETHNIC CONFLICTS 251, 253 (John McGarry & Brendan
O’Leary eds., 1993).
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progressively took to farming, leasing out lands for sugarcane cultivation
from the indigenous Fijians. They made such rapid inroads into this sector
that very soon control of sugarcane production passed into their hands.45
Considering that the sugar industry is the backbone of the Fijian economy,
and the fact that the lands had been taken on fixed-term leases from
indigenous Fijians, Indian dominance in this sector rendered “what would
normally be a powerful political base into a tinder box of communal
conflict.”46
The indigenous Fijian and Indian populations have, for the most part,
remained separate over the years, each adhering to its own culture, religion,
language and social customs. The sole determinant of identity is ethnic
affiliation, with de facto segregation featuring in almost all walks of life,
including clubs, trade unions and other voluntary organisations. One author
ascribes this state of affairs to the history of British rule which, he says, is
“broadly speaking, one of benevolent apartheid.”47
Another legacy of British rule which has been at the root of Indian
grievances over the years is the denial of electoral equality to the Indian
population.48 The origins of this grievance go as far back as 1904 when
Indians went completely unrepresented in the colonial Legislative Council,
even as the indigenous Fijians were given guaranteed representation.49 The
grudging allocation in 1916 of one seat to the Indians failed to assuage their
feelings of disenfranchisement. By 1937, the position of the Indians had
improved slightly,50 but their basic demand for a “common” electoral roll,
which would entrench the principle of “one-man-one-vote”, went unheeded.
This issue was to have far-reaching implications for the future of democratic
government in Fiji; it was rooted in a fear of Indian domination of Fijian
politics, as one writer has explained:
Because the Fijians were governed under a separate native
administration, the Indian demand for a common roll
challenged European control of the colonial council and was
interpreted as an attempt to introduce Indian political
domination in Fiji. The equation of the demand for a common
roll with the alleged desire of Indians to dominate politically

45

Id.
Id.
47
LAL, supra note 43, at 1.
48
See, e.g., ROBBIE ROBERTSON & WILLIAM SUTHERLAND, GOVERNMENT BY THE GUN: THE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF FIJI’S 2000 COUP 67 (2001).
49
The Council comprised six elected Europeans, two nominated Fijians and ten European official
members.
50
Indians were granted five seats (three elected, two nominated) in an expanded Council, the other
members of which were five Europeans (three elected, two nominated), five Fijians (all elected by the
Council of Chiefs), and sixteen European officials.
46
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the entire society has since become a pervasive theme in the
communal politics of Fiji.51
The demand for a common roll was also resisted on another controversial
ground, namely, the claim of indigenous Fijians, vis-à-vis Indians (who are
often derisively referred to as “guests” to this day), to perpetual
“paramountcy” in the governance of Fiji. This claim is not supported by any
documentary evidence; instead, it appears to have acquired political force by
virtue of repeated assertion.52 Whatever the merits of the claim, it has
dominated political discussion and has proved to be the single biggest
stumbling block on the road to the accommodation of Indian interests.

B.

Independence and After

As Fiji moved towards independence from British rule in the 1960s,
further changes were made to the electoral system, but the policy of sectoral
representation continued.53 This period also saw the emergence, for the first
time, of political parties: two of them, the Alliance Party (with a support
base drawn largely from indigenous Fijians, Europeans and others) and the
National Federation Party (supported largely by Indians) dominated the
scene. Despite strong resistance from the indigenous Fijians to the
termination of colonial rule,54 a combination of domestic British political
compulsions and international pressure led to the colony being granted
independence on October 10, 1970.
The grant of independence did not, however, resolve the intractable
issue of a common roll. By way of temporary solution, a system combining
communal and national representation within both ethnic groups (with parity
of numbers in the lower house of the new bicameral legislature) was
adopted. As a sop to Fijian nationalism, the Great Council of Chiefs was
given a dominant role—including a veto on matters relating to Fijian land
and customs—in the upper house. The Chiefs were also able, by virtue of
their sheer numerical strength in the upper house, to block any changes that
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Premdas, supra note 44, at 259.
Attempts have also been made to justify the claim on the basis of what some commentators
consider to be a strained interpretation of the 1874 Deed of Cession. See, e.g., Stephanie Hagen, Race,
Politics, and the Coup in Fiji, 19 BULL. CONCERNED ASIAN SCHOLARS 2 (1987).
53
Under this policy, indigenous Fijians and Indians were allowed to elect their representatives to a
new legislative council on exclusively ethnic lines.
54
When it became clear that independence was inevitable, the first indigenous Governor-General,
Ratu George Cakobau (the great-grandson of the “King of Fiji” who had ceded Fiji to the Crown in 1874)
pleaded: “Let the British government return Fiji to Fijians in the state and in the same spirit with which
Fijians gave Fiji to Great Britain.” N. MELLER & J. ANTHONY, FIJI GOES TO THE POLLS: THE CRUCIAL
LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS OF 1963, at 103 (1968) (quoting Cakobau).
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may be attempted to the Constitution enacted at independence,55 if they
chose to do so. Even as the issue of the common roll was kicked into the
long grass, attempts were made to forge a government of national unity in
the early 1980s, but these attempts foundered amidst increasing inter-ethnic
rivalry.
A turning point in Fiji politics came in the general elections of 1987
when the National Federation Party, in league with the newly-formed
Labour Party, managed to trounce the Alliance Party and pave the way for
the first Indian-dominated government. Although this government was
headed by an indigenous Fijian, Timoci Bavadra, it was seen as a clear
challenge to Fijian “paramountcy” and it led to a sustained campaign,
including violent protests, by a group which called itself the “Taukei
Movement.” Using the growing unrest as a pretext, Lieutenant-Colonel
Sitiveni Rabuka, a high-ranking officer in the Royal Fiji Military Forces,
mounted a coup on May 14, 1987. Lt-Col. Rabuka stoked the fears of the
Fijian nationalists and endorsed their “Fiji for Fijians” campaign, abrogated
the Constitution, and declared Fiji a republic.56
The aftermath of the 1987 events has been sufficiently well
documented to merit brief repetition here.57 Suffice it to say that those
events marked a new low in inter-ethnic relations and led to a large-scale
exodus of the Indian population. For the first time since the Second World
War, Indians had once again been reduced to a minority.58
The events of 1987 also led to the promulgation of another
Constitution in July 1990 (this time by presidential decree)59 which
increased the political dominance of indigenous Fijians quite substantially.
Under this Constitution, a new seventy-member legislative chamber was
constituted, with thirty-seven seats being reserved for Fijians, as against
twenty-seven for Indians, one for Rotumans and five for the other
minorities, all to be elected by their respective communities. The position of
Prime Minister was reserved for an indigenous Fijian. The Constitution also
55
This Constitution had been enacted by an Order-in-Council passed by the departing British: the
Fiji Independence Order 1970.
56
The declaration of Fiji as a republic was made in a second coup in September 1987, after Lt-Col.
Rabuka expressed dissatisfaction over insufficient progress on a new Constitution that he had promised
immediately after seizing power the previous May. For an ex post facto justification by Rabuka of his
actions in relation to the coups, see Sitiveni L. Rabuka, The Fiji Islands in Transition: Personal
Reflections, in FIJI BEFORE THE STORM: ELECTIONS AND THE POLITICS OF DEVELOPMENT 7-20 (Brij V. Lal
ed., 2000) [hereinafter FIJI BEFORE THE STORM].
57
See, e.g., MICHAEL C. HOWARD, FIJI: RACE AND POLITICS IN AN ISLAND STATE (1991); A. Ravuvu,
THE FAÇADE OF DEMOCRACY: FIJIAN STRUGGLES FOR POLITICAL CONTROL 1830-1987 (1991); LAL, supra
note 43; BRIJ V. LAL, ANOTHER WAY: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN POST-COUP FIJI
(1998); FIJI BEFORE THE STORM, supra note 56; CONFRONTING FIJI FUTURES (Haroon A. Akram-Lodhi ed.,
2000); COUP: REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL CRISIS IN FIJI (Brij V. Lal & Michael Pretes eds., 2001).
58
In the census which followed the 1987 coups, the population break-down was reported as follows:
Indigenous Fijians—50.7%, Indians—43.7%, Rotumans and others—5.6%.
59
Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of Fiji (Promulgation) Decree 1990.
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gave a bigger role to the Fijian Great Council of Chiefs: most appointees to
the thirty-four-member upper house of parliament would henceforth have to
be approved by the Council. For good measure, the Constitution also
granted immunity from prosecution to those involved in the 1987 coups.
But, in an interesting twist, the leaders of the Indian community managed to
persuade the President to include in the Constitution a clause which required
its provisions to be reviewed within seven years.60
The Constitution was seen as blatantly discriminatory.61 Even so, it
was accepted by the Indian political leaders who undertook, albeit
reluctantly, to play by its rules in the hope that some of its unacceptable
features could be changed during the promised review. That review was
announced in March 1995 when the President of Fiji appointed a three-man
Fiji Constitution Review Commission (FCRC) headed by Sir Paul Reeves,62
a former Governor-General of New Zealand. After extensive consultation
with a wide range of interests—including overseas experts—the
Commission presented a report63 which was seen as comprehensive,
balanced and well thought out.64
C.

New Constitutional Beginnings

The FCRC proposed a new Constitution to replace the 1990
document. Its recommendations as to the contents of the new Constitution
were given wide public and parliamentary airing, and after much debate—
including extensive consideration by a Joint Parliamentary Select
Committee—most of the recommendations were adopted. It is worth noting
that the FCRC had been obliged, under its Terms of Reference, to ensure that
its work shall be geared towards “promoting racial harmony and national
unity and the economic and social advancement of all communities.”
Furthermore, it was required to “[bear] in mind internationally recognised
principles and standards of individual and group rights”65 while formulating
its recommendations.
The new Constitution was signed into law on July 25, 1997 and
brought into force exactly a year later after being unanimously passed by
both Houses of Parliament. It embodied a Compact among Fiji’s peoples
60

Fiji Islands Const. Amendment Act 1997 ch. 11 pt. 2 § 161.
A report prepared by the National Federation Party, with the assistance of Professor Yash Ghai, a
well-known academic expert, condemned the document as being characterised by “racism, authoritarianism
and feudalism.” See YASH GHAI, NAT'L FED'N PARTY, THE FIJI CONSTITUTION OF 1990: A FRAUD ON THE
NATION 17 (1991).
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The Fiji Constitution Review Commission.
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Fiji Constitution Review Commission, The Fiji Islands: Towards a United Future, Parliamentary
Paper No. 34, 1996.
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See, e.g., ROBERTSON & SUTHERLAND, supra note 48, at 110-12.
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Terms of Reference of the Fiji Constitution Review Commission, issued by the President of the
Republic of Fiji, Mar. 15, 1995.
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based on a set of principles which reflect “shared understandings about the
future participation of all ethnic communities and groups in the country’s
life and government.”66 It is worth noting, too, that “all the main political
parties accepted that the primary goal of Fiji’s constitutional arrangements
should be to encourage the emergence of multi-ethnic governments.”67 In
other words, the settlement reached had as wide a measure of crosscommunity support as could reasonably be expected in any divided society.
Significantly, it was approved without dissent by a Parliament dominated by
indigenous Fijians.
In terms of its main provisions, the Constitution first of all attempted
to move the country away from the system of exclusively communal
representation in Parliament, so that politicians were encouraged to look
beyond their own narrow support-bases and address issues that concerned
members of other communities as well. It made a modest beginning in that
direction by ordaining that twenty-five of the seventy-one seats in the lower
house (the House of Representatives) should be “open seats,” available for
contest, and to be voted for, by people of all communities.68 It required
elections to be conducted under a system of proportional representation
called the “alternative vote” rather than under the “first-past-the-post”
system prevailing under previous Constitutions.69 It also envisaged a multiparty Cabinet under which the Prime Minister (who would be someone who,
in the opinion of the President, is capable of forming a government and
likely to enjoy the confidence of the House of Representatives)70 was
required to invite all parties whose membership in the House of
Representatives comprised at least ten percent of the membership of the
66
This Compact was itself incorporated in the Constitution. See Fiji Islands Const. Amendment Act
1997 ch. 2 § 6. Among the principles embodied in the Compact are that: the rights of all individuals,
communities and groups are fully respected; the ownership of Fijian land according to Fijian custom, and
the rights and landlords under leases of agricultural land, are preserved; the right to religion, language,
culture and traditions of everyone is secured; the enjoyment of equal rights of all citizens, regardless of
their communal affiliation, including the right to make their permanent homes in Fiji, is guaranteed; the
rights of the Fijian and Rotuman people to governance through their own separate administrative systems is
preserved; and in the event of any conflicts involving the interests of different communities, these shall be
settled through negotiation in good faith. Id. Unsurprisingly, the Compact also included a provision to the
effect that, in any such negotiations, “the paramountcy of Fijian interests as a protective principle continues
to apply.” Id. ch. 2 § 6(j). To further reflect Fijian aspirations, the Parliament added another clause which
required that “equitable sharing of political power amongst all communities in Fiji is matched by an
equitable sharing of economic and commercial power.” Id. ch. 2 §6(l). This was to counterbalance the
advantage that the Indian community had traditionally enjoyed in the commercial sphere.
67
Alison Quentin-Baxter, Ethnic Accommodation in the Republic of the Fiji Islands (Sept. 1999)
(unpublished manuscript prepared for Waikato University School of Law), available at
http://lianz.waikato.ac.nz/PAPERS/baxter/Baxter1.pdf.
68
This represented a significant dilution by Parliament of the FCRC’s recommendation that fortyfive seats should be designated as “open” seats. On the question of the compatibility of racially-based
“reserved” seats, the FCRC accepted the opinion of an academic expert that “short-term differentiations
based on race and ethnicity might be lawful if, historically, they had been generally accepted as the basis of
political representation.” See id.
69
Fiji Islands Const. Amendment Act 1997 ch. 6 pt. 2 § 54(1).
70
Id. ch. 7 pt. 3 § 98.
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House to nominate Ministers in proportion to their respective strength in the
House.71 Where a party declines to nominate, the number of Cabinet posts
that it would be entitled to would be allocated among the other parties in
proportion to their own entitlements. In the event of all parties declining to
nominate, the Prime Minister will be at liberty to select MPs from his own
party or coalition of parties to fill the Cabinet places.72 Significantly, the
Constitution dispensed with the controversial requirement—introduced by
the 1990 Constitution—that the Prime Minister could only be chosen from
among indigenous Fijians.
The Constitution also does not require that the President or the VicePresident be an indigenous Fijian, although by conferring the power of
appointment on the Great Council of Chiefs, the possibility of non-Fijians
being appointed to these posts is generally seen as remote.73 The Great
Council of Chiefs has been allowed to retain its power of veto over certain
amendments to the Constitution as they did under previous Constitutions.74
A Bill of Rights, which is binding on all three branches of government
at all levels and on any person exercising public functions, guarantees basic
freedoms and liberties. The right to equality, by far the most contentious
issue in Fijian society, has been qualified to allow for permissible
discrimination in relation to such matters as the application of the personal
law of individual communities,75 affirmative action for disadvantaged
groups,76 land and fishing rights and chiefly status for members of the
indigenous communities,77 and the application of other customary laws.78
The Constitution gives equal parity to English, Fijian and Hindustani
languages,79 and makes discrimination on the basis of language unlawful.80
It prescribes no official state religion, despite strong demands from some
indigenous Fijians to declare the country a Christian state.81
In sum, the 1997 Constitution was seen as offering a fair deal to all
Fijians and as a document which held out the promise of a new beginning in
inter-ethnic relations. The settlement it embodied was, by and large,
acceptable to all sides, as the senior counsel to the FCRC noted:
71

Id. § 99. The total number of Cabinet posts was left to be determined by the Prime Minister.
Id. § 99(7)-(8).
73
According to the criteria approved by the Great Council of Chiefs under the 1990 Constitution,
anyone chosen for these posts must be “Fijians” of chiefly birth or chiefly descent. There is nothing in the
1997 Constitution to indicate that those criteria are no longer applicable. The only concession to
democratic practice made in that Constitution is that the Great Council of Chiefs must consult the Prime
Minister prior to making any appointment to either post. Id. § 90.
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Id. § 38.
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Id. § 44.
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See, e.g., id. § 186.
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Id. § 186.
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[A] majority in each community, sensitised perhaps by the 1987
coups and their aftermath, were ready to respond favourably to
ways of strengthening the values and interests that all
communities share, while continuing to protect the already
well-recognised rights and interests of the indigenous people
and other distinct communities or groups.82
Even so, there were voices of dissent. A group of hardline Fijian
nationalists, supported by a small but vocal minority of Muslim extremists,
which had earlier launched a noisy, but unsuccessful, campaign to sabotage
the acceptance of the Reeves Report continued to rail against the
Constitution, arguing, among other things, that it represented a “sell-out” of
the interests of the indigenous Fijians. This undercurrent of disgruntlement
was to play a not insignificant part in the violent events of May 2000
described below.
D.

The 1999 Election and the May 2000 Coup

The spirit of general goodwill which greeted the 1997 Constitution
appeared to prevail in the run-up to the first general election held under its
terms in 1999. In this election, in which the leaders of all the major parties
stood for the “open” rather than “reserved” seats, a multiracial coalition,
consisting of the Fiji Labour Party (FLP), the Fijian Association Party
(FAP), the Veitokani ni Levenivanua Vekaristo (VLV), and the Party of
National Unity (PANU) achieved a landslide victory, securing fifty-eight of
the seventy-one available seats.83 It paved the way for the first Prime
Minister of Indian origin, Mahendra Chaudhry, who led the dominant
partner in the coalition, the FLP.84 The election was remarkable for a
number of reasons, not least for the fact that the proportion of seats gained
by the members of each community (regardless of their party affiliations)
matched almost exactly the proportion of their respective community’s
strength within the Fijian population.85
The promise of greater inter-ethnic harmony held out by the results of
the 1999 election was, however, short-lived. Within a year, the Chaudhry
government was deposed in a coup d’etat mounted on May 19, 2000 by
George Speight, a failed businessman of mixed Fijian-European parentage,
who held many of its members hostage in the Parliament building. This led
to the declaration of emergency by the President and the assumption of the
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Quentin-Baxter, supra note 67, at 165.
The two older parties, the predominantly Indian National Federation Party (NFP) and the
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei (SVT), led by Sitiveni Rabuka in his new civilian incarnation, were
effectively decimated.
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The FLP won 37 of the 58 seats secured by the coalition.
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reins of government by the army.86 The coup was followed by widespread
violence, arson and loss of life on a scale unseen during the 1987 coups.87
Even so, it was put down and the hostages released within weeks. Speight
and his co-conspirators were taken into custody, and subsequently tried and
convicted for treason.88
Opinion is divided on the reasons for the coup.89 Certainly the
rhetoric which accompanied the seizure of power by Speight relied heavily
on alleged widespread dissatisfaction among the indigenous Fijian
population over what it saw as a dilution of its rights and privileges by the
1997 Constitution. In particular, it was argued that, by not recognizing—and
entrenching—the paramountcy of Fijian interests, the Constitution had
denied the indigenous Fijians their right under international law to internal
political control. This argument had been decisively rejected as untenable
by the leaders of all major political parties, including the Fijian nationalist
SVT90 party, in the run-up to the adoption of the Constitution. These leaders
maintained that international law did not confer on members of indigenous
communities any rights of paramountcy or predominance over other citizens,
for that would amount to a breach of the basic principle of equality
enshrined in all global human rights instruments.91
Other factors, too, appear likely to have played a part in the coup.
One noticeable difference between the 1987 coups and the events of May
2000 was that, whereas the former had the full backing of the Fijian army,
the latter did not: if anything, the army, under the leadership of Commander
Bainimarama, became a key player in thwarting the designs of Speight and
his fellow revolutionaries.92 Their resort to nationalist rhetoric, which found
86
The President, Ratu Sir Kamesese Mara, also prorogued Parliament for six months. On May 29,
2000, he himself “stood down” and the Head of the Fiji Armed Forces, Commander Bainimarama,
assumed the powers of the President before appointing another civilian, Ratu Uluivuda, to the post on July
13, 2000.
87
Some 16 persons were reported to have been killed in the violence which followed the coup; a
large number of (mostly Indian-owned) shops and farm houses were torched; and, for the first time in Fiji’s
history, a refugee camp had to be set up to house those fleeing the carnage.
88
For a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the coup, see Brij V. Lal, Madness in
May: George Speight and the Unmaking of Modern Fiji [hereinafter Lal, Madness in May], in FIJI BEFORE
THE STORM, supra note 56, at 175-194.
89
Among the explanations that have been offered are: growing disgruntlement among indigenous
Fijians over the “concessions” made by the 1997 Constitution to non-Fijian (i.e. Indian) interests; social,
economic and political divisions among that community; alienation of some sections of the business
community by the socialist policies of the Chaudhry government; and, last but not least, Speight’s own
overweening political ambitions. See, e.g., id.; Susanna Truka, Introduction: Communities in Crisis, 25:4
PACIFIC STUDIES 1 (2002).
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See, e.g., Parliament of Fiji, The Daily Hansard, June 30, 1997, House (speech of Sitiveni Rabuka,
the leader of the SVT party, in the Fijian Parliament, in the debate over the Reeves Report). It is interesting
to note, in this context, that the provisions of the 1997 Constitution had been expressly approved by the
highest official body representing indigenous Fijian interests, the Great Council of Chiefs, who were
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Commander Bainimarama has, since the reversal of the coup, been in the forefront of the efforts to
bring to justice those army officers who were seen to have supported Speight and his fellow plotters.
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a ready echo among disgruntled sections of the indigenous population, was,
it appears, but an opportunistic ploy to conceal their true designs.93 It has
also been suggested that the events of May 2000 may have drawn sustenance
from serious tensions that had been growing over the years between Fijian
commoners and the traditional chiefs.
Many prominent politicians
representing Fijian interests had been prophesying an end to the power and
privilege enjoyed by the chiefs and to their dominance in government.94
Despite the relatively swift suppression of the coup, efforts to return
the political institutions to their original state were tardy, and in some vital
respects non-existent.
The martial law administrator, Commander
Bainimarama, handed over power to an Interim Civilian Government,
headed by Laisinia Qarase, a former merchant banker and senator, on July 4,
2000, but not until after announcing his decision to abrogate the 1997
Constitution. The Qarase government showed no indications of wanting to
reconvene Parliament. A situation of political paralysis ensued, although a
degree of normality had been restored to civilian life within weeks.
IV.

THE FIJIAN JUDICIARY’S CONTRIBUTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL
RESTORATION

A.

The Prasad Litigation

In the midst of all this, one institution of state which showed a
remarkable willingness to stem the illiberal tide and to restore democracy
and the rule of law was the judiciary. In the first of a series of high-profile
rulings,95 the High Court of Fiji, sitting in Lautoka, held, among other
things, that: (a) the coup mounted by George Speight and his supporters had
been unsuccessful; (b) the purported abrogation of the Constitution by
Commander Bainimarama was null and void; and (c) the Parliament which
had been elected in 1999 had not been dissolved, but was merely prorogued.
These rulings came in a case filed by Chandrika Prasad, an Indo-Fijian
farmer whose property had been torn down by a marauding mob in the
immediate aftermath of the coup. The court, after embarking on a detailed
discussion of the doctrine of necessity and the doctrine of revolutionary
legality (a doctrine which has in the past often been used to justify regime
93
A highly plausible explanation for the coup, offered by commentators such as Lal, is that it was an
act of naked self-interest by Speight and a group of ambitious young businessmen like him who, having
profited from economic largesse in the form of large, unsecured loans supplied by the National Bank of Fiji
with the blessings of the Rabuka Government in the 1990s, suddenly found their prospects for continued
prosperity dimming under the new administration of Mahendra Chaudhary. Lal, Madness in May, supra
note 88, at 181. It is worth noting that Speight had been staring at financial ruin just before the coup,
having been dismissed as the head of the Fiji Pine Commission and Hardwood Corporation—a post he had
held under political patronage—and having also been declared an undischarged bankrupt.
94
See, e.g., id. at 192.
95
Chandrika Prasad v. Republic of Fiji [2001] NZAR 385.
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change following a coup d’etats) struck a decisive blow for
constitutionalism and for the primacy of the rule of law. The doctrine of
necessity could not, it said, “be used to give sustenance to a new extraconstitutional regime. Nor could it provide a valid basis for abrogating the
Constitution . . . .”96 These sentiments were endorsed by the Fiji Court of
Appeal in appellate proceedings brought by the Government.97
The judiciary’s determination to reverse the assaults on the
Constitution and the rule of law manifested itself in a number of other
decisions as well. In Jokapeci Koroi & Ors. v. Asesela Ravuvu & Ors.,98 the
High Court rebuffed an attempt by the Interim Civilian Government to
introduce a new constitutional dispensation which would have done away
with many of the checks and balances—including safeguards for minority
rights protection—that were contained in the 1997 Constitution. Holding
that it was no part of the legitimate or reasonable mandate of a caretaker
government to bring about such drastic changes to the body politic of the
nation, the Court stopped the formation of a Constitutional Review
Commission in its tracks. Such a step, it said, could only be taken by a
democratically elected government:
The doctrine of necessity is a narrow doctrine and does not
cover matters outside of the routine and the necessary.
Unusual programmes of expenditure or reformist projects are
the prerogative of an elected government. A lawful government
needs to be buttressed by holding the confidence of the House
of Representatives, and by acting within the Constitution with
the two other bodies of Parliament, namely, the Senate and the
President. Moving in advance of the will of Parliament in
reformist fields, however well intentioned, is not an act which
the courts will validate under the necessity doctrine. The
authorisation for the expenditure of public funds for such
reform work is similarly outside the permitted scope of work of
a caretaker Cabinet.
Such authorisation is unlawful.
Parliament which carries the necessary constitutional
jurisdiction and authority for reform may, when elected, set up
a Parliamentary Select Committee for such work.99
The case for preserving the pre-revolutionary constitutional scheme—and
historic constitutional values—was put even more forcefully in another
case100 in which the High Court had been called upon to rule on the legality
of a fiscal measure which the Interim Civilian Government had attempted to
96
97
98
99
100

Id. at 403.
Republic of Fiji v. Chandrika Prasad [2001] NZAR 385.
Action No. HBC 131-2001-L.
Id (citations omitted). Order of Gates J., June 15, 2001 (copy on file with author).
Jokapeci Koroi & Ors. v. Commissioner of Inland Revenue & Anr., Action No. HBC179/2001L.

FEBRUARY 2006

RESTORATION CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE SOUTH PACIFIC

61

introduce through decree. After finding that no case had been made out by
the government which demonstrated any real or urgent need for the
measure—thus ruling out resort to the doctrine of necessity101—the court
underlined the need at all times for the Constitution to be salvaged from the
wreckage left behind by usurper regimes:
Even in an extreme case, where a usurper leaves behind nothing
of the past, the original Constitution remains submerged. When
the usurper withdraws, it will re-emerge. During the rule of the
usurper, judges may choose to accord validity to the usurper’s
rule under the doctrine of effectiveness, although I have
indicated the world trend is against according legitimacy in
these circumstances.102
The court’s observations on the sanctity that is to be accorded to a
democratically-accepted Constitution are worth noting as well. Such a
Constitution is, said the court, indestructible:
The Constitution’s very indestructibility is part of its strength.
It is not possible for any man to tear up the Constitution. He
has no authority to do so. The Constitution remains in place
until amended by Parliament, a body of elected members who
collectively represent all of the voters and inhabitants of Fiji.
During a period of dire emergency it may endure suspension, if
such a suspension will ultimately see the Constitution
supported, and ensure its re-emergence. Such a situation
occurred in Fiji following the events of 19 May 2000.103
Insofar as the Fijian judiciary has played a crucial, defining role in forging
post-revolutionary constitutionalism, some parallels can be drawn with the
constitutional courts established in Eastern and Central Europe since the fall
of the Berlin Wall. Although the factual circumstances prevailing in those
countries were markedly different from those obtaining in Fiji, the similarity
in the legitimacy which the respective judiciaries enjoyed in the eyes of their
own people is striking. In Fiji as in Eastern Europe, when confronted with
authoritarian measures which threatened basic constitutional values and
human rights, concerned citizens turned to the courts who were able, in the
words of Ruti Teitel, “to draw a thin but bright line demarcating the rule of
law.”104
101
“There is a danger,” said the court, “in allowing the doctrine of necessity to degenerate into a
doctrine of convenience, a doctrine to avoid awkward or embarrassing situations.” Id. at 25 (official
transcript).
102
Id. at 20 (official transcript).
103
Id. at 16 (official transcript).
104
Ruti Teitel, Post-Communist Constitutionalism: A Transitional Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 167, 182 (1994).
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Also, the Fijian judiciary, like some of the post-communist
constitutional courts, served as a beacon of hope in a bleak political
landscape. By their principled approach which steered well clear of
confrontational tactics or needless grandstanding, the judges managed to
acquire a degree of legitimacy unmatched by any other agency of state.
They may also have, albeit unwittingly, helped define a more principled
politics, as did, for example, the Russian Constitutional Court in its bruising
encounters with the Yeltsin administration in the early 1990s.
B.

Commitment to Constitutional Continuity

Viewed objectively, the actions of the Fijian courts represent a
commitment to the principle of constitutional continuity, which, as a rule of
law value, is rightly prized in both ordinary and transitional times. The
advantages of this course of action are only too obvious: not only does it
avoid the turmoil and the pains associated with constitutional “clean
breaks,”105 it also helps to ease the tension between constitutionalism and
political change that is inherent in societies struggling to return to
democracy and the rule of law. A similar kind of constitutional continuity
was seen in those former Soviet bloc states which had experienced “velvet
revolutions,” although the impetus for such continuity in those states came
not from the courts but from negotiated political processes.106
Even when viewed in the light of the classic rule-of-law dilemma
which arises in post-revolutionary states,107 the Fijian courts’ adherence to
the principle of constitutional continuity is not without virtue. It accords
fully with the requirement, often asserted by legal positivists, that “the
principle of rule of law governing transitional decision-making should
proceed—just as it would in ordinary times—with full continuity of the
written law.”108 The written law, in the case of Fiji, moreover, is a prior law
which, as noted earlier, enjoyed a high degree of popular legitimacy before
its attempted extinguishment by an interloper. Here, the rule-of-law value
was, it is submitted, properly served by the Fijian judiciary’s insistence on
constitutional continuity.
Interestingly, the Fijian approach accords just as well with the natural
law position under which there is an expectation that the rule of law will, in
paradigmatic transitions, turn its face decisively against injustices committed
by tyrannical or oppressive past regimes, regardless of whether such
105
Including the need, for example, to forge a new constitutional consensus which is extremely
difficult in deeply divided societies.
106
See, e.g., Andrew Arato, The Constitution-Making Endgame in Hungary, EAST EUROPEAN CONST.
REV. 31 (Fall 1996).
107
For a discussion of this dilemma, see Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in
Political Transformation, 106 YALE L.J. 2009, 2018-21 (1997).
108
Id. at 2019.
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injustices could be justified under any putative laws introduced by those
regimes. Given the peculiar circumstances under which the Fijian judges
were called upon to adjudicate, they did not have to deal with complex
questions usually associated with such putative laws. Their approach did,
however, affirm such classic rule of law attributes as predictability,
foreseeability and, most important of all, security—in the protection of both
the person and property.109
Although the exertions of the judiciary did not result in the
reinstatement of the duly elected government of Prime Minister Mahendra
Chaudhry110—the government which had been deposed, and whose members
had been taken hostage, by George Speight and his accomplices—they did,
however, put a brake on Fiji’s slide into lawlessness and military rule. To
the extent that the status quo ante was not fully restored, there was indeed a
discontinuity, but this discontinuity did negligible damage to the meta-ruleof-law value which was, when seen in the round, upheld in abundant
measure.
C.

Putting Down Markers

In practical terms, the series of high-profile court judgments put an
end to General Bainimarama’s ambitions of jettisoning the 1997
Constitution and establishing an extra-constitutional regime in which the
military would have played a dominant, if not exclusive, role, and which
would, arguably, have led to the permanent—or at least long-term—eclipse
of civilian government in Fiji. But more importantly, these judgments put
down some crucial markers which, viewed through the “restoration
constitutionalism” prism, are hugely significant: they signalled, in the
strongest possible terms, the need for a return to the pre-revolutionary
constitutional order, albeit with some compromises being made along the
way. As a result of the judiciary’s efforts, even the military, which had
attempted to abrogate the Constitution in the immediate aftermath of the
May 2000 coup, now respects the supremacy of that document.
Quite clearly, the vigor, determination and alacrity with which the
Fijian judiciary—at all levels—exerted itself in the attempts to arrest the
109
Here, a parallel can be drawn with the approach adopted by the Hungarian Constitutional Court in
its judgment of Mar. 5, 1992 (Magyar Kozlony No. 23/1992) on the constitutionality of the law which
allowed the retrospective prosecution of those responsible for suppressing the 1956 uprising against Soviet
occupation.
110
An attempt to achieve the reinstatement failed in the High Court, because the presiding judge,
Scott J., took the view that, although the President of the Republic had committed a constitutional breach
by not reconvening the Parliament that had been suspended as a result of the May 2000 coup, this breach
could be condoned under the doctrine of necessity. Furthermore, since fresh elections had already been
held and a new Prime Minister (Qarase) elected by the time the case was heard in the High Court, it was
“not feasible to turn the clock back” to the pre-coup position as that would cause a “legal and
administrative nightmare.” Rev. Akuila Yabaki & Ors. v. President of the Republic of the Fiji Islands &
Anr., Civil Action No. HBC 119 of 2001S, Judgment dt. July 11, 2001, at p.17 (official transcript).
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longer-term impact of the coup on democracy and the rule of law, even as it
recognised the limits of judicial activism in such circumstances, is
extraordinary. It stands in sharp contrast to the traditional behavior of courts
during periods of constitutional crises.111 Part of the reason for such judicial
courage is, it is submitted, the fact that nearly all the judges who heard the
cases described above were “foreign,” i.e., judges specially brought in from
other jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand and Tonga, to sit in the
higher courts of Fiji. These judges are unlikely to carry any political or
chauvinistic baggage of a kind to which home-grown judges are, alas, all too
often prone in most jurisdictions. They are also, on the whole, likely to be
more detached in their assessment of highly charged arguments of a political
nature that feature quite prominently in such cases.
More significantly, the heroic efforts of the courts in returning Fiji to
the rule of law and to democratic politics continued well beyond the
restoration of the 1997 Constitution. In that sense as well, the Fijian
experience is exceptional, because not many coup-affected countries can lay
claim to similar judicial activism in recent years. It may be useful in this
context to look at the impact that the actions of the Fijian judiciary had on
subsequent political developments.
D.

Reinstating Pre-Coup Constitutional Values

This return to the pre-revolutionary constitutionalism involved a
journey which was as painful as it was slow. (It is also a journey which is far
from complete). The Interim Civilian Government ordered fresh elections to
the Fijian Parliament in August-September 2001—elections which, despite
the somewhat febrile atmosphere in which they were held, were seen to be,
on the whole, free and fair. They brought forth a coalition government
headed by Laisenia Qurase, whose party, the Soqosoqo Duavata ni
Lewenivanua (SDL) emerged as the single largest party in Parliament,112
with the Fijian Labour Party (FLP), still headed by Mahendra Chaudhry,
coming a close second.113
Under the terms of the 1997 Constitution,114 every party which has ten
percent or more of the membership of the House of Representatives was
entitled to representation in the Cabinet in direct proportion to their numbers
in the House. Accordingly, Chaudhary as the leader of the FLP staked his
claim to Cabinet seats, but his claim was ignored by the Prime Minister on
the grounds that there was a huge and unbridgeable gap in policy terms
between the SDL and FLP which made it impossible for any agreement to be
111
See, e.g., George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by National Courts
During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1984).
112
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113
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114
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reached on a programme for government. The Prime Minister also argued
that he already possessed, by virtue of his coalition, the necessary numbers
in the House to form a stable government, and that he did not therefore need
any support from the FLP. If he was forced to enter into a coalition with
Chaudhary, there was, he said, a real risk that his own party would become a
minority within such coalition—a risk which he was simply unwilling to
countenance.115
In purely legal terms, the Prime Minister’s stand was that the
constitutional provision requiring power-sharing did not automatically
entitle any political party with ten percent or more representation in
Parliament to be given seats in the Cabinet. All that it required was for the
Prime Minister to invite all eligible parties to be represented in the
Cabinet—a requirement which was just a mandatory first step in good faith
negotiations aimed at forming a multi-party government.
If those
negotiations failed to produce agreement, the Prime Minister could treat the
failure as an implied rejection of his invitation by the other party or parties
and proceed to allocate the Cabinet seats to which they were entitled among
other participating parties in proportion to their respective initial
entitlements, as provided by the Constitution.116
Following Qarase’s failure to offer the FLP any Cabinet seats,
Chaudhary approached the courts. After extensive arguments in which rival
interpretations of the constitutional provisions on power-sharing were
canvassed, the High Court,117 the Court of Appeal118 and the Supreme
Court119 all came to the conclusion—unanimously in each case—that the
requirement of power-sharing was mandatory and not merely optional The
obligation contained in Section 99 of the Constitution could not be fulfilled,
said the judges, by the Prime Minister merely opening negotiations in good
faith, as Qarase had contended. They drew support for this conclusion from
the wording of Section 99, the guidance offered by other relevant provisions
(including, importantly, the Compact contained in Section 6 with its strong

115
The Prime Minister had, however, as a matter of formality written to Chaudhary inviting him to
join the Cabinet under the terms of Section 99(5) of the Constitution, and Chaudhary had replied in the
affirmative. However, Chaudhary insisted that his party’s participation in government would be in
accordance with the provisions of the ‘Korolevu Declaration’—a Declaration issued by the leaders of
certain political parties in 1999, but to which the SDL had never assented. One of the requirements of that
Declaration was that “Cabinet decision making in Government should be on a consensus seeking basis
especially with regard to key issues and policies.”
116
Fiji Islands Const. Amendment Act 1997, ch. 7 pt. 3 § 99(7). The Constitution further provides
that, where all parties to whom invitations have been issued decline such invitations, the Prime Minister
could fill the vacancies in Cabinet from his own party or coalition of parties. Id. §99(8).
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Civil Action No. 282/2001L, Judgment dt. Apr 24, 2002.
118
Judgment dt. 24 May 2002. See also, Miscellaneous Case No. 1/2001, Judgment dt. Feb. 15,
2002, in which the Court of Appeal offered its opinion on a Case Stated by the High Court on 29 Nov
2001.
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Civil Appeal No. CBV 0004 of 2002S, Judgment dt. July 18, 2003.
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emphasis on an “equitable sharing of political power”), and the historical
background to the 1997 Constitution.120
The judges gave short shrift to Qarase’s argument that the wide policy
differences which existed between his party and that of Chaudhary, made
power-sharing all but impossible:
In the context of the prior history and the constitutional crises
to which we have referred above, power sharing amongst the
ethnic communities of Fiji, as expected to be reflected (at least
in the medium term) in the party affiliations of members of the
House of Representatives, was a central purpose of the
Constitution. That purpose would not be served and, indeed,
could be fundamentally undermined, if an invitation by a Prime
Minister under s. 99(5) could be subject to conditions or if the
establishment of a multi-party Cabinet were determined by the
fact, let alone by the Prime Minister’s opinion, that a political
party which comprises at least ten per cent of the membership
of the House, was unwilling to pursue or accept particular
policies.121
Nor, said the Court, was it inevitable that policy differences between
members of a coalition of parties would sabotage a power-sharing
government, especially under the Westminster model with its strong
traditions of collective responsibility of ministers and cabinet
confidentiality:
Division of opinion in cabinets is nothing new.
The
conventions of collective responsibility and cabinet
confidentiality respond to division and allow conflict in Cabinet
to be managed so that effective government is possible. The
Prime Minister is entitled therefore to say that his own
appointees intend to implement the policies of his party. That is
not to prevent representatives of other parties from urging their
own policies where they arise. Nor is it beyond the bounds of
possibility that negotiated outcomes in the national interest will
be reached. Section 99 [of the Constitution] aims to encourage
debate on contentious policies including debate across party
lines. It may also be observed that there is much in the routine
business of government that will not involve any real clash of

120
The Supreme Court noted, for example, that “[t]he Constitution of 1997 is the product of a long
period of social and political tension in Fiji including a number of events that can only be described as
constitutional crises.” Id. at 30 (official transcript).
121
Id. at 45.
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policy at all. Indeed, much of the routine work of individual
Ministers does not require references to Cabinet.122
Having thus failed in his attempts through the courts to keep the FLP out of
government, Qarase was compelled to enter into negotiations with
Chaudhary on power-sharing. These negotiations dragged on for several
months, and included a further round of legal proceedings in which the
Supreme Court was asked to clarify the formula to be used for the
apportionment of Cabinet seats between the SDL and FLP respectively. The
Supreme Court’s verdict,123 namely, that the FLP was entitled to fourteen
seats in a thirty-six-member Cabinet (with the SDL enjoying sixteen places),
was seen by observers as offering the prospect of ending “once and for all
the three year constitutional crisis over power sharing,”124 but in the event no
such result ensued. Faced with the humiliation of being offered some of the
most inconsequential ministries by Qarase (some of these ministries were
little more than departments carved out of existing ministries held by the
SDL), the FLP, in November 2004, decided against joining the government.
Chaudhary opted instead to take on the post of Leader of the Opposition, in
which role he vowed to hold the government accountable to the electorate,
and resolved to lead his party back into power at the next general elections,
scheduled for 2006.
E.

Punishment of the Coup-Leaders

Meanwhile, in a further move designed to persuade both domestic and
international public opinion about its determination to return Fiji to the rule
of law, the Qarase government embarked on a swift trial of George Speight
and ten others who were involved in the attempted coup and the seizure of
Parliament in May 2000. The issue of punishment for the coup-plotters
aroused strong passions within the country, and it was viewed by many
observers as likely to exacerbate extremist, radical feelings among a section
of the indigenous Fijians, who saw Speight as a hero capable of resisting
Indian “domination” in Fijian politics and government.125 The legal
proceedings against Speight provoked many unanswered questions, not least
on account of the fact that Speight, in a dramatic move, pleaded guilty to the
central charge of treason at the outset of the trial. Although he was awarded
the mandatory death sentence applicable for this offence, the sentence was
122
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promptly commuted to one of life imprisonment in what has been seen as
the result of a political deal by most observers.126 His ten co-accused were
sentenced to jail terms ranging from eighteen months to three years, after
their charges were reduced from treason to wrongful confinement of
members of the government—another example, it is said, of a pleabargain.127
A number of other persons have also been implicated in the May 2000
coup, and some of them have since been charged and convicted of aiding
and abetting Speight and his accomplices. The most high-profile of such
defendants, Ratu Seniloli, who continued to hold office as Vice-President of
the Republic until as recently as August 2004, was sentenced to four years’
imprisonment, although in yet another controversial move, the Qarase
government offered him early release a few months later on grounds of his
poor health. Other prominent figures in the Fijian political establishment
who have been convicted for their participation in coup-related activities
include a former Deputy Speaker of the national parliament, a former sports
minister, and a former Attorney-General.
It is believed that the swift and decisive punishment for Speight and
his fellow plotters owed much to international pressure, notably from the
Governments of Australia and New Zealand.128 Whatever the truth of the
matter, there is no denying that there was considerable Australian
involvement in the trial proceedings, with Peter Ridgeway and Mark
Tedeschi, two Australian lawyers, leading the prosecutions against Speight
and Seniloli respectively. It is believed, too, that another Australian, Andrew
Hughes, who has occupied the position of Police Commissioner in Suva in
recent years, kept up the pressure for the coup-plotters to be brought to
justice. It is not without significance, incidentally, that a large measure of
intimidation preceded some of the trials: in the proceedings against Speight,
for example, the judge originally assigned to the case, Justice Peter Surman
(from England), decided to withdraw and leave Fiji after receiving death
threats.129
Whether the full truth about the coup and about those involved in
planning and executing it has been exposed by these trials is a moot
question. There has been considerable speculation within Fiji and outside
126
Under Fijian law, the President of the Republic can commute sentences of death if so advised by a
Commission on Prerogative of Mercy. A recommendation to that effect was made in the case of Speight
within hours of his being sentenced on February 18, 2002. In a separate move, the Attorney-General had
moved a Bill in Parliament to abolish the death penalty altogether, but that Bill had not been approved by
Parliament at the time of Speight’s sentencing.
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that the coup had the backing of many others who may have succeeded in
escaping prosecution.130 Most commentators are agreed, however, that the
speedy manner in which most of the coup-related trials were conducted at
least helped avert serious unrest and potential large-scale violence,
especially in the national capital, Suva.
The treatment of George Speight and the others involved in the
derailment of democracy in Fiji raises some interesting questions for
transitional justice scholars about the appropriateness of the methods chosen
to deal with the grave human rights abuses which accompanied the May
2000 coup, but those questions are beyond the scope of the present article
and must await consideration elsewhere.
V.

THE RESTORATION: AN IMPERFECT BUT NOT INSIGNIFICANT SUCCESS

A.

Costs and Gains of the Return to Constitutionalism

As with most transitions, the return to constitutionalism was neither
painless nor without cost. The cost, in tangible terms, consisted of a
jettisoning, on the questionable grounds of “necessity,” of a democratically
elected Parliament and a duly constituted government.131 (In effect, this
meant the disenfranchisement of the sizeable majority of Fijians who had
supported the Fiji Labour Party.) Although the High Court of Fiji
acknowledged that the President of the Republic was in clear breach of the
Constitution when he failed to summon Parliament after its prorogation on
May 27, 2000, it refused to reverse that decision on the grounds that to do so
would “create a legal and administrative nightmare.”132 That decision has
been criticized, not least by another judge of the High Court, who felt that
there was “a danger in allowing the doctrine of necessity to degenerate into a
doctrine of convenience, a doctrine to avoid awkward or embarrassing
situations.”133 However, these actions show, as starkly as ever, that “the rule
of law capacity of transitional societies cannot be expected to function at the
same level as states that have a consolidated liberal juridical apparatus.”134 It
also perhaps demonstrates the practical limits of judicial activism in conflictridden societies where constitutionalism has but a tenuous hold.
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That said, the gains have not been insignificant. The success of the
restoration process in Fiji can be measured under a number of heads, and the
picture which emerges is, on the whole, a positive one.
1.

Reinstatement of the Pre-Revolutionary Constitution and
Constitutional Values.

The sanctity of the 1997 Constitution has been firmly and
unmistakably established. It has been acknowledged by both the politicians
and the civil service. Fresh elections to Parliament have been held on the
basis of its provisions and the power-sharing principles contained in the
Constitution have been accepted by all sides, despite some initial quibbling
over the precise mode of their application.
2.

Reinstatement of Functionaries to Their Old Offices.

With the exception of the members of the Chaudhary Government and
of the Parliament dissolved in March 2001 (many members of which were
re-elected to that body in September 2001), almost all the functionaries who
held public office prior to the coup have been returned to those offices. The
military has retreated to its barracks and political and administrative power
have been handed back to a civilian administration. Public watchdogs and
oversight agencies, such as the Audit Commission, continue to perform their
functions in much the same way as they did prior to the events of May 2000.
3.

Reparation for Tangible Material Losses.

Although no large-scale scheme of compensation for those who
suffered losses to their property in the aftermath of the coup has been put in
place, there has been an official acknowledgement of these losses and some
of those affected have been provided with state-funded rehabilitation
assistance.
4.

Restoration of Law and Order and Strengthening of Democratic
Institutions.

The near-total breakdown of law and order, especially in the capital
city of Suva, which followed the events of May 2000 has been reversed, and
civilian life has been restored as nearly as possible to a state of pre-coup
normality. The new government has signalled its intention to strengthen
democracy and make the institutions of state responsive to the needs and
aspirations of the Fijian people. Although ethnic rivalry and dissatisfaction
among both the indigenous Fijians and Fijians of Indian descent over access
to political power and economic resources still remains, a significant
measure of communal harmony has been restored.
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Punishment for Those Responsible for the Coup:

As noted above, George Speight and those involved in the seizure of
Parliament and in hostage-taking were swiftly brought to trial. Speight
himself remains in prison on a sentence of life imprisonment, while his
accomplices were handed down sentences ranging from eighteen months to
three years. There has been disquiet—both within the country and outside—
over the perceived unwillingness of the Qarase Government’s to investigate
the role of some high-profile members of the Fijian elite in the planning of
the coup, but a combination of domestic criticism and international pressure
(notably from the Australian and New Zealand Governments) did result in
the trial—and conviction—of a number of former dignitaries, including
government ministers. The campaign to bring those responsible for the coup
to justice continues, and it is likely that a few more prosecutions may follow.
B.

Factors Conducive to the Restoration Process

Quite clearly, a number of factors have contributed to the relative
success of the Fijian experiment in “restoration constitutionalism,” and it is
necessary to understand these if any lessons are to be drawn for the future.
Reference has already been made, at some length, to the extraordinary
courage of the Fijian higher judiciary, without whose timely intervention the
outcome of the events of May 2000 would have been radically different.
Second, it cannot be denied that the swiftness with which the law and
order enforcement agencies in Fiji reacted to the derailment of democracy
by Speight and his accomplices went some way in stemming the country’s
slide into irreversible lawlessness and anarchy. Although the Commander of
the Fiji Military Forces did attempt to abrogate the Constitution, he drew
back from that drastic step once the courts had signalled their disapproval of
such action. It is to the credit of the Commander, too, that he readily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the courts unlike military in other
jurisdictions who have, in such circumstances, usually sought—and
succeeded—in emasculating the judiciary.
The swiftness of the moves towards “normalisation” also meant that
the damage caused to democratic institutions and processes was minimal and
comparatively easier to repair.
By contrast, the restoration of
constitutionalism in other jurisdictions where it has been practiced, e.g. the
countries of the former Soviet Union, has been a much harder and much
longer-drawn out process.
Third, credit must also be given to the role played by the international
community for Fiji’s comparatively quick return to its pre-revolutionary
state of liberal democracy. The sustained pressure that foreign governments,
notably the Governments of Australia and New Zealand, exerted on the
authorities—military and civilian—in Fiji to undo the effects of the May
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2000 coup made a significant difference. That pressure continued well after
the restoration of civilian rule, and was also responsible, to a significant
degree, for ensuring that George Speight and others responsible for the coup
were made to stand trial.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The events in Fiji described above represent, however imperfectly, an
instructive example of the “restoration” modality of transition wherein the
country has been able to return, quickly and successfully, from a state of
constitutional breakdown to a democratic status quo ante. The status quo
ante in this case was the liberal settlement embodied in the 1997
Constitution. That Constitution, as well as containing strong human rights
protection for all citizens, struck what most observers consider a fair balance
between the rights, interests and aspirations of the two main population
groups comprising this deeply divided nation.135
The Fijian experience exemplifies what the authors of a recent article
have called a “reassertion of law’s domestic and international legitimacy.”136
It highlights the usefulness of even ordinary legal processes in delivering
beneficial change within societies where the rule of law has suffered a
serious setback. If “the success of the transition in a law-based state turns
on a reversal of the kind of legal de-legitimation that occurred during the
conflict,”137 then the transition in Fiji, incomplete though it is in some
respects, can still be characterized as largely successful. What is more,
unlike the restoration constitutionalism that occurred in some of the postcommunist states—a phenomenon which has been criticized for “offer[ing]
dubious stability”138—the return to the pre-revolutionary constitutional order
in Fiji has been accompanied by a significant measure of legal and political
stability.

135
It is also, it might be added, a Constitution which had been adopted following a transparent
democratic process which included extensive consultation with all sections of the Fijian population as well
as thorough parliamentary scrutiny. See Quentin-Baxter, supra note 67, esp. at pp. 11-14.
136
Christine Bell, Colm Campbell & Fionnuala Ni Aolain, Justice Discourses in Transition, 13:3
SOCIAL AND LEGAL STUDIES 305, 305 (2004).
137
Id. at 312.
138
TEITEL, supra note 7, at 206.

